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1 Introduction
Privacy-preserving mutual authentication addresses the security and privacy
issues in Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) systems. In such an authen-
tication protocol, readers and tags can authenticate each other. It also hides
the identities of tags against adversaries who cannot authenticate them. The
existing privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocols can be classified
into weak privacy based on symmetric cryptography (e.g., [11,14]) and strong
privacy based on public-key cryptography (e.g., [40,1]). Roughly speaking, for
weak privacy, the tag privacy will be compromised (can be traced) once the
secret state on the tag is known; while for strong privacy the tag cannot be
traced, even if the adversary corrupts the tag and obtains the secret state on
it.
An RFID system consists of the three components: tags, readers and a
backend server. We found that all existing mutual authentication protocols in
the literature consider all readers as a single entity. This assumption, how-
ever, has at least two drawbacks. First, it cannot preserve tag privacy because
all readers can identify tags. Second, if a reader is corrupted, the privacy
of all RFID tags will be compromised. This single-entity assumption is ac-
companied by high-risk privacy issue. The potential solution to address these
drawbacks is privacy-preserving mutual authentication with designated read-
ers (PP-MADR). That is, each tag has its designated readers (in a group of
readers), such that only the tag and its designated readers can authenticate
each other. While for other readers and adversaries, they cannot trace tags or
know their designated readers.
A PP-MADR protocol should consist of a reader authentication and a tag
authentication. However, it is a daunting task to propose a PP-MADR proto-
col especially for reader authentication with preserved privacy. The tag must
verify the reader is one of its designated readers without leaking any private
information to readers, who are potential none designated readers or adver-
saries. We found traditional solutions require linear storage growth on a tag,
or linear computation growth on a tag, or new key generations for designated
readers to identify a new created tag. These solutions are impractical as RFID
tags are passive with limited storage, and the number of tags could be huge
in an RFID system.
1.1 Related Work
RFID authentication with preserved tag privacy has been widely studied in
the last decade. Most of them focused on tag authentication and some of
them were proposed for mutual authentication. The existing authentication
protocols can be classified into the following two types.
The first type (e.g., [25,36,38,2,11,28,20,9,3,4,14,15] ) is based on sym-
metric cryptography, using pseudo-random function and hash function, which
offer a very efficient computation with a low cost.
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The second type (e.g., [43,8,40,39,10,42,34,41]) is based on public-key
cryptography, such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). In this type, tags
are required to perform exponentiations or point multiplications. Although
public-key cryptography is more expensive compared to symmetric cryptogra-
phy, Lee et al. [32] and Hein et al. [22] have shown that the ECC can be now
realized on RFID tags.
Several privacy models [26,43,40,10,23,13] in the context of RFID have
been proposed. In these privacy models, adversaries are divided into differ-
ent classes, depending on restrictions regarding which oracles they can ac-
cess. Among these privacy models, the notion of strong privacy provides the
strongest privacy where no adversary can identify or trace a tag, even given all
secrets stored on the tag [41]. However, only authentication protocols based on
public-key cryptography can achieve strong privacy. When a tag is corrupted,
symmetric-based authentication protocols can no longer preserve tag privacy
because all tag communications are identifiable with the secret on the tag.
Several RFID authentication protocols were proposed to achieve strong pri-
vacy. Bringer et al. [8] and Liu and Ning [34] proposed zero-knowledge based
authentication protocols. Peeters and Hermans [41] proposed more efficient
protocols with the same technique. Vaudenay [43] firstly proposed a tag au-
thentication protocol based on a generic public-key encryption (PKE) with
a formal security proof. Paise and Vaudenay [40] extended the tag authen-
tication in [43] to mutual authentication. For more efficient authentication,
Canard et al. [10] proposed hash ElGamal based protocol. Oren and Feldhofer
[39] and Saarinen [42] respectively used randomized Rabin encryption in pro-
tocol design. There are also some other authentication protocols [12,30,31,29]
based on public-key cryptography, but they are later found insecure in [8,17,
35].
Very recently, Nan et al. [33] in RFIDSec 2014 introduced privacy-preserving
authorized RFID authentication protocols. The proposed protocols have the
same motivation as the PP-MADR protocol in tag authentication for those
authorized/designated readers only. However, this work didn’t consider reader
authentication. The proposed protocols mainly focused on how to let an online
server authorize readers in tag authentication but the server does not know
which tag is being authenticated. We note that our PP-MADR protocol does
not requires an online server and hence the corresponding problem does not
exist.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this work, we propose an efficient PP-MADR protocol with strong privacy.
In comparison with trivial solutions and previous solution, our PP-MADR
protocol captures the following nice features.
– The secret state stored on a tag is constant-size and independent of the
number of tag’s designated readers. It costs only a storage of several kilo
bits.
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– The computational cost on a tag for reader authentication is very small.
We achieve this property by transferring most computations to readers.
– The computational time on a tag in mutual authentication is constant. If
a reader is one of tag’s designated readers, it can identify the tag via one
mutual authentication.
– There is no new key generation for readers. In our protocol, the RFID
system server does not need to compute new private keys for designated
readers when creating a new tag. Each reader has one private key only.
– The privacy of a tag and its designated readers is well preserved. Our tag
cannot be traced from mutual authentication, and designated readers are
anonymous, even if the adversary obtains the secret state on the tag.
We evaluate our protocol in terms of computational cost, storage cost and
hardware cost. The result shows that our protocol exhibits the above nice
features without significantly increasing cost.
The rest of this is organized as follows. In Section 2, after formulating the
requirements of PP-MADR, we introduce some solutions towards PP-MADR
and the framework of ours. The algorithms of our solution are formalized
in Section 3. Our PP-MADR scheme is proposed in Section 4, with security
and privacy analysis in Section 5. We evaluate our scheme in Section 6, and
conclude this work in Section 7.
2 The Solutions of PP-MADR
In privacy-preserving mutual authentication with designated readers (PP-
MADR), each reader is assumed to be an independent entity. When a tag
is created, some readers are selected and designated to identify this tag. A
proposed PP-MADR protocol should satisfy the following properties:
1. For security, tags and their designated readers can authenticate each other.
2. For privacy, tags and their designated readers should be indistinguishable
(cannot be traced) against other readers and adversaries.
A PP-MADR protocol is composed of reader authentication and tag au-
thentication. We note that reader authentication in PP-MADR protocol should
not only verify reader identity but also reader designation. I.e., the reader is
one of designated readers. In the PP-MADR protocol, the reader authentica-
tion must be completed before the tag authentication; otherwise, the privacy
of tags will be easily compromised.
Tag authentication with strong privacy has been well studied in the lit-
erature such as [40,1,23,33]. In the following of this section, we propose a
tag authentication protocol from identity-based cryptography, and introduce
some solutions to reader authentication. After the analysis of these solutions,
we propose the framework of our PP-MADR protocol.
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2.1 Tag Authentication
The given tag authentication is associated with the following notations.
T : The identity of a tag.
ID: The identity of a reader.
MPK: A master public key.
msk: The master secret key of MPK.
w: Random number.
dT : The private key of tag T .
dID: The private key of reader ID.
σw: Identification proof on w computed with dT .
IBE: Identity-based encryption.
I: A group of readers {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDk}.
In PP-MADR protocol, each reader is an independent entity. We cannot
assume there exists a unique secret key shared by a tag and a reader as it
will give a large number of keys stored on both tags and readers. We therefore
adopt a tag authentication from identity-based encryption.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [6] is a variant of PKE. There is a master
key pair (MPK,msk), known as master public key and master secret key
respectively (generated and kept by the RFID system server). In such a scheme,
the public key of a user (e.g. reader) is the user’s identity ID, while the private
key dID is generated from ID and msk. When a message is encrypted with
ID, it requires the private key dID of ID for successful decryption.
Tag Reader
(MPK,T, dT ) MPK, dID
w,ID←−−−
M = T |σw
C = IBEID[M ]
C−−−→
Decrypt M = T |σ′w
Output T if σ′w is valid
Otherwise, output Reject
Fig. 1 The tag authentication from IBE.
The tag authentication works as follows. Upon receiving an authentication
query (w, ID) from a reader ID, where w is a random number, the tag T runs
an IBE encryption to encrypt (T, σw) with identity ID. Here, T is the identity
of tag and σw is the corresponding identification proof
1. Next, the ciphertext is
sent to the reader. Finally, the reader decrypts (T, σw) using dID, and verifies
the tag T through checking the identification proof σw. The tag authentication
is depicted in the Fig 1.
1 We can use a digital signature scheme to generate such a proof using the private key dT
of tag.
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The response of tag is a ciphertext. Without a valid private key, the ci-
phertext cannot be successfully decrypted. Therefore, even if the adversary
obtains the secret state on a tag, the tag still cannot be traced from the tag
authentication (the view of ciphertext).
2.2 Reader Authentication
In PP-MADR protocol, the above tag authentication must be carried out
after the reader authentication. I.e., the reader is ID and ID is one of tag T ’s
designated readers.
We note that it is not hard to verify the identity of reader. For example, we
can achieve reader identification from the above modified tag authentication.
Instead of encrypting a message M , the tag encrypts a random number R.
The reader proves its identity if it can decrypt and send R back to the tag.
The challenging task is the verification of reader designation. Let I1, I2, · · · , IL
be all designated-reader groups known by all readers. At the beginning of
reader authentication, the reader does not know which group was chosen for
the tag. If we allow the tag to disclose its designated readers, the verification
of reader designation can be quite simple and efficient. For example, we use a
secure collision-resistant hash function H. The tag stores the hash value hI of
I, and the reader proves that ID ∈ I and H(I) = hI. It is easy for the tag to
conduct these two verification. Unfortunately, this solution does not preserve
tag privacy as their designated readers are disclosed. All adversaries can easily
compromise tag privacy by launching a reader authentication.
For all solutions without disclosing I, the reader must guess hI in tag before
conduct the proof of ID ∈ I and H(I) = hI to tag. Upon receiving such a
proof, if hI is the tag’s reader group, the tag runs the mutual authentication
as Fig 1 by encrypting T |σw|R. Otherwise, tag must still perform encryption
by encrypting dummy identity to resist guessing attack on reader identity
because any adversary can provide a proof of ID ∈ I and H(I) = hI to tag.
We note that the mutual authentication time could be impractical due to the
computation on tag especially when the reader is designated in N different
reader groups I1, I2, · · · , IN .
Another problem in the above solutions without disclosing designated read-
ers is the tag privacy. When I or hI is stored on the tag, the privacy about
its designated readers will be compromised when the tag is corrupted and the
adversary obtains the secret state on the tag. Hence, the secret state stored on
tags must not reveal I in order to achieve strong privacy against adversaries
who can corrupt tags.
Another potential way which is completely different from above solutions is
generating unique keys associated with T and ID for reader ID, if the reader
is designated to identify the tag T . For example, the server generates private
key dT |ID for reader ID to identify the tag T , where the tag encrypts M
using identity T |ID (IBE) to respond query from ID. This solution, however,
requires the RFID system server to generate new private keys for all designated
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readers when a new tag is created. This new key generation therefore is also
impractical for reader authentication.
2.3 Our PP-MADR Solution (Framework)
The construction of our PP-MADR protocol takes all above factors into ac-
count. That is, we should address the problems of liner growth of storage, linear
growth of computation overhead, new key generation and privacy information
leakage due to corruption.
To avoid all these drawbacks, we design the protocol in the following way.
Firstly, an anonymous and short group token GT is computed to represent I
for tag T . The anonymity means the adversary cannot distinguish designated
readers from GT. Then, the secret state (T, dT ,GT) are uploaded to the tag.
Finally, we construct the mutual authentication as follows (Fig 2).
Tag Reader
(T, dT ,GT) MPK, dID, I
w,ID←−−
M = R|T |σw
C = EID,GT[M ]
Store (ID,R)
C−−→
Decrypt M = R′|T |σw
Output T if σw is valid
Otherwise, output Reject
R′←−−
Output ID if R′ = R
Otherwise, output Reject
Fig. 2 Our PP-MADR protocol (Framework).
(Reader→Tag) The reader (ID) randomly chooses a random number w and
sends (w, ID) to the tag.
(Tag→ Reader) Upon receiving (w, ID), the tag chooses a random number
R and computes identification proof σw, which is the same as tag authenti-
cation. Then, it encrypts (R, T, σw) with (GT, ID) in the way that successful
decryption requires
– The private key dID of ID.
– ID ∈ GT. I.e., ID ∈ I.
Finally, the tag sends the ciphertext to the reader.
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(Reader→ Tag) Upon receiving the ciphertext, the reader tries to decrypt it
using dID and a designated-reader group I. If the reader can decrypt (R′, T, σw)
and σw is valid, it outputs T and sends R
′ back to the tag.
(Tag) Upon receiving R′ from the reader, the tag outputs reader identity ID
if R′ is equal to R. Otherwise, the tag outputs reject.
If there exists such a secure encryption scheme and GT is anonymous from
the view of none-designated readers (without a valid private key), this protocol
is a PP-MADR protocol. The mutual authentication is completed between a
tag and its designated readers. The tag cannot be traced as the ciphertext
needs a private key for decryption and it hides both tag identity and GT.
In comparison with introduced solutions in Section 2.2, this PP-MADR
protocol exhibits the following advantages.
1. Short storage on tags. Our PP-MADR protocol only requires the tag to
store a short group token GT for reader authentication. In our construction,
GT is a constant-size group token independent of the number of designated
readers in it. It is much shorter than storing linear-size I directly.
2. Efficient computation on tags for reader authentication. The struc-
ture of our PP-MADR protocol is quite similar with the given tag authen-
tication except the additional random number R and the new encryption.
Without considering the new encryption, our reader authentication only
requires the tag to choose a random number and conduct bit string com-
parison.
3. Constant-time computation on tags. The mutual authentication only
requires three moves between tag and reader. If the reader is one of desig-
nated readers, after three moves, the mutual authentication will return tag
identity and reader identity. There is no case that the reader is a designated
reader but the mutual authentication outputs reject. The tag in the proto-
col performs all computations only one time. Therefore, the computation
time on tags is constant.
4. No new key generation for readers. Our protocol does not need to
generate new private keys for all designated readers when a tag is created.
Each reader only keeps one private key of its identity. Our protocol requires
all readers to previously receive all designated-reader groups that include
their identities. This requirement is also desired in the proof of reader
designation without disclosing I.
5. Strong privacy on tags and their designated reader groups. Even
if the adversary corrupts a tag and obtains the secret state on it, the
adversary cannot trace the tag from the mutual authentication (the view
of ciphertext), or distinguish tag’s designated-reader group from the group
token. The privacy of both the tag and its designated readers is strongly
preserved in our protocol.
In the following sections, we show how to construct such a PP-MADR
protocol. We firstly formalize the algorithms in the protocol, and then give
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the detailed description of each algorithm. The core of our protocol is the
particular encryption requiring dID and ID ∈ GT for successful decryption.
We note that there is no such an encryption in the literature. Our encryption
notion is entirely new.
3 Algorithm Definitions
3.1 Definition of PP-MADR
Based on the introduced framework of our PP-MADR solution in Section 2.3,
we now formally define the associated algorithms of our protocol in this section.
Our scheme is composed of the following four algorithms.
– Setup: Taking as input the security parameter 1λ and the upper bound
size of designated-reader group n, the setup algorithm returns a master
public key MPK and a master secret key msk. This algorithm is run
by the RFID system server. msk is used to generate private keys for all
readers and tags. MPK is published to all readers. Let I1, I2, · · · , IL be all
potential designated-reader groups also published to all readers.
– RKeyGen: Taking as input a reader identity ID and the master secret
key msk, the reader key generation algorithm returns a private key dID of
ID. This private key is secretly generated by the server and delivered to
the reader ID by a secure channel.
– TSetup: Taking as input a tag identity T , a designated reader group
I = {ID1, ID2, · · · IDk} and the master secret key msk, the tag setup
algorithm returns a private key dT of T and a group token GT. This algo-
rithm is run by the server. The identity, private key and group token are
uploaded to the tag.
– Authentication: This is an interactive protocol. The reader takes as input
the private key dID,MPK and its designated-reader group(s) (I1, I2, · · · , IN ).
The tag takes as input (T, dT ,GT). If the reader ID has been designated
to identify the tag T , the mutual authentication will be successful. The tag
outputs the identity of reader and the reader outputs the identity of tag.
Otherwise, the reader outputs nothing about the tag, and the tag outputs
reject in authentication.
The correctness of PP-MADR scheme must satisfy that for all (MPK,msk,
ID, T, dT ,GT), if ID ∈ GT, the mutual authentication between T and ID will
be successful, i.e., the reader and the tag can identify each other.
3.2 Security Models
The PP-MADR protocol should satisfy the following security requirements.
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– The identification proof σw is unforgeable without the valid key dT .
– The message encrypted with (ID,GT) is indistinguishable without the pri-
vate key dID or ID /∈ GT.
We define two security models to capture the security requirements of PP-
MADR. They are Tag Unforgeability model for tag authentication against
an adversary who has no private key of tag, and Message Indistinguishabil-
ity model for reader authentication against an adversary who has no private
key of one of designated readers. They are defined through game playing be-
tween a challenger and an adversary.
Tag Unforgeability. This model is to withstand all attacks of forging a valid
proof σw without the private key dT .
Setup: The challenger generates the master key pair with the security pa-
rameter λ and a private key of T . The master public key and tag identity T
are sent to the adversary.
Query: The adversary makes authentication queries on w, and the chal-
lenger responds by generating σw, which is sent back to the adversary.
Win: The adversary outputs a valid identification proof σw∗ on w
∗, where
w∗ is generated by the challenger.
Definition 1 The PP-MADR scheme is (t, qk, ε)-secure with tag unforgeabil-
ity if for all adversaries in t polynomial time who make qk queries, we have ε
is a negligible function associated with the security parameter λ.
Message Indistinguishability. This model is to withstand all attacks in
distinguishing message encrypted with (ID∗,GT∗) without the key dID∗ or
ID∗ /∈ GT∗.
Initialization: The adversary outputs a designated-reader group {ID∗1 , ID∗2 ,
· · · , ID∗k} and an identity ID∗ for challenge. If ID∗ ∈ {ID∗1 , ID∗2 , · · · , ID∗k},
the adversary cannot query the private key of ID∗; otherwise, the adversary
can query all private keys.
Setup: The challenger generates the master key pair with the security pa-
rameter λ, and sends the master public key to the adversary.
Query: The adversary makes the following queries.
– The private keys of reader identities satisfying the condition stated in the
initialization phase.
– The token GTi for any designated-reader group Ii.
Challenge: The adversary outputs two messages M0, M1 and a group token
GT∗ for challenge, where GT∗ denotes {ID∗1 , ID∗2 , · · · , ID∗k} generated in the
query phase. The challenger randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1} and generates
a challenger ciphertext C∗ on the message Mc encrypted with (ID
∗,GT∗).
Win: The adversary outputs a guess c′ of c and wins the game if c′ = c.
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Definition 2 The PP-MADR scheme is (t, qk, ε) selectively secure with mes-
sage indistinguishability if for all adversaries in t-polynomial time who make
qk key queries, we have ε is a negligible function associated with the security
parameter λ.
3.3 Privacy Models
The PP-MADR protocol should satisfy the following requirements for strong
privacy.
– The designated-reader group in the group token GT is indistinguishable.
This privacy requirement is to preserve the privacy of designated readers,
even if the adversary corrupts the tag and obtains the group token.
– The tag identity and its group token GT are indistinguishable from the
view of ciphertext, even if the adversary obtains the secret state on the
tag. This requirement is to stop an adversary from tracing tags.
We define Reader Indistinguishability model to capture the anonymity
of designated-reader group I from the view of GT. The message indistinguisha-
bility implies the tag identity is indistinguishable against an adversary who has
no private key of one of designated readers. We define Token Indistinguisha-
bility model to capture the anonymity of group token GT from the view of
ciphertext against an adversary who has no private key of one of designated
readers.
Reader Indistinguishability. This model is to withstand all attacks in dis-
tinguishing the designated-reader group without a private key of designated
reader.
Initialization: The adversary outputs two designated-reader groups I0 =
{ID∗01 , ID∗02 , · · · , ID∗0k0} and I1 = {ID
∗1
1 , ID
∗1
2 , · · · , ID∗1k1} for challenge. The
adversary is not allowed to query the private key of any identity in the above
two groups.
Setup: The challenger generates the master key pair with the security pa-
rameter λ, and sends the master public key to the adversary.
Query: The adversary makes the following queries.
– The private keys of reader identities satisfying the condition stated in the
initialization phase.
– The token GTi for any designated-reader group Ii.
Challenge: The challenger randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1} and generates
GT∗ from Ic for the adversary.
Win: The adversary outputs a guess c′ of c and wins the game if c′ = c.
Definition 3 The PP-MADR scheme is (t, qk, ε) selectively secure with reader
indistinguishability if for all adversaries in t-polynomial time who make qk key
queries, we have ε is a negligible function associated with the parameter λ.
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Token Indistinguishability. This model is to withstand all attacks in dis-
tinguishing the group token from the view of ciphertext without a private key
of designated reader.
Initialization: The adversary outputs two designated-reader groups I0 =
{ID∗01 , ID∗02 , · · · , ID∗0k0} and I1 = {ID
∗1
1 , ID
∗1
2 , · · · , ID∗1k1} for challenge. The
adversary is not allowed to query the private key of any identity in the above
two groups.
Setup: The challenger generates the master key pair and sends the master
public key to the adversary.
Query: The adversary makes the following queries.
– The private keys of reader identities satisfying the condition stated in the
initialization phase.
– The token GTi for any designated-reader group Ii.
Challenge: The adversary outputs (ID∗,M∗) and (GT∗0,GT
∗
1) for challenge,
where GT∗0,GT
∗
1 are the group tokens for I0 and I1, respectively. The challenger
randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1} and generates C∗ with (GT∗c, ID∗) on M∗
for the adversary.
Win: The adversary outputs a guess c′ of c and wins the game if c′ = c.
Definition 4 The PP-MADR scheme is (t, qk, ε) selectively secure with token
indistinguishability if for all adversaries in t-polynomial time who make qk key
queries, we have ε is a negligible function associated with the parameter λ.
4 Our PP-MADR Scheme
4.1 Cryptographic Background
Our PP-MADR scheme is built from a pairing group. Let BG = (G1,G2,GT , g1,
g2, p, e) be the pairing group, where G1,G2 are the elliptic group and GT is the
multiplicative group. The three cyclic groups are of the same order p. Here, g1
is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2. e is the bilinear map capturing
the three properties:
– For all g1 ∈ G1, h2 ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ga1 , hb2) = e(g1, h2)ab.
– If g1 is a generator of G1 and h2 is a generator of G2, we have e(g1, h2) is
a generator of GT .
– There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, h2).
4.2 Building Blocks
Membership encryption was first introduced by Guo, Mu, Susilo and Varad-
harajan in [21]. In this notion, the encryption takes as input an attribute A
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and an anonymous token representing a set of attributes A. Successful de-
cryption requires that A ∈ A is true. We modify this encryption with two
improvements to construct PP-MADR protocol. Firstly, taking as input GT
and ID in encryption, successful decryption requires not only ID ∈ GT but
also the private key dID of ID. Secondly, the group token GT is anonymous
from the view of ciphertext for all adversaries who have no private key of the
designated reader.
We utilize the BLS signature scheme [7] and Diffie-Hellman key exchange
to generate the identification proof σw. The private key dT of tag is a BLS
signature on a secret random number x ∈ Zp. The core of identification proof
is computed with w ∈ G1 and x as wx. For simply understanding, x can be
seen as the real private key of tag.
4.3 Scheme Description
Setup: Taking as input the security parameter 1λ and the upper bound size
n of designated-reader group, the setup algorithm works as follows.
– Choose a pairing group (G1,G2,GT , p, e).
– Randomly pick g1, h1 ∈ G1 and g2, h2 ∈ G2 such that logh1g1 = log
h2
g2 .
– Randomly choose α, β from Zp and compute
U = h1, h
α
1 , h
α2
1 , · · · , hα
n
1 , h
β
1 , h
βα
1 , h
βα2
1 , · · · , h
βαn
1 , g
α
1 , h2, h
β
2
– Compute the pairing e(g1, h2).
– Pick a collision-resistant hash functions H defined as H : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
The master public key MPK are composed of(
G1,G2,GT , p, e, U, e(g1, h2), H
)
,
and the master secret keys are (g1, g2, α, β).
RKeyGen: Taking as input a reader identity ID ∈ Z∗p and the master secret
key, the key generation algorithm randomly chooses s ∈ Zp and computes the
private key dID of ID as
dID =
(
g
s
(α+ID)(β+ID)
2 , h
s−1
α
2 , h
s
2, h
sα
2 , · · · , hsα
n−2
2
)
.
TSetup: Taking as input a tag identity T , a designated-reader group I =
{ID1, ID2, · · · IDk} and the master secret key msk, the tag setup algorithm
works as follows.
– Randomly choose x ∈ Zp and computes dT of T as
dT = (d
1
T , d
2
T , d
3
T ) =
(
x, hx2 , H
β(d2T , T )
)
.
14 Fuchun Guo et al.
Tag Reader(
T, dT , h
ηF
1 , h
ηFβ
1 , g
ηα
1 , e(g1, h2)
η
)
(ID, dID,MPK, I1, I2, · · · , IN )
Choose a random w
w,ID←−−−−−
M = R|T |σw
C =
(
h
F (β+ID)η·r
1 , g
ηα·r
1 , e(g1, h2)
η·r ⊕M
)
Store (ID,R)
C−−−−→
(ID,C)
Decrypt M = R′|T |σw
Output T if σw is valid
Otherwise, output Reject
R′←−−−−
Output ID if R′ = R
Otherwise, output Reject
Fig. 3 The mutual authentication between tag and reader in our scheme.
– Randomly choose η ∈ Zp, and compute GT as
GT =
(
hηF1 , h
ηFβ
1 , g
ηα
1 , e(g1, h2)
η
)
,
where F =
∏k
i=1(α+ IDi) and h
F
1 is computed from U .
Authentication: The reader takes as input parameters (ID, dID,MPK, I1, I2,· · · , IN )
and the tag takes as input (T, dT , h
ηF
1 , h
ηFβ
1 , g
ηα
1 , e(g1, h2)
η), the mutual au-
thentication works as follows (depicted in Fig 3).
– The reader randomly chooses w ∈ G1 and sends (w, ID) to the tag.
– Upon receiving (w, ID) from the reader, the tag randomly chooses r,R ∈
Zp and works as follows.
– Compute σw with dT as σw =
(
wxd3T , d
2
T
)
.
– Set M = R|T |σw.
– Generate the ciphertext (c1, c2, c3) as(
h
F (β+ID)η·r
1 , g
ηα·r
1 , e(g1, h2)
η·r ⊕M
)
,
which is forwarded to the reader. (ID,R) is stored for reader authentica-
tion.
– Upon receiving the ciphertext, the reader takes as input (ID, dID,MPK, I1,
I2, · · · , IN ) and computes
e1 = e
(
c1, g
s
(α+ID)(β+ID)
2
)
= e(g1, h2)
F
α+ID ·rηs. (1)
Next, the reader takes as input (ID, dID, Ij) (j = 1) and tries to decrypt
M as follows.
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– Let F =
∑
ID∈Ij (α + ID), and bi be the coefficient of α
i in Fα+ID .
Compute
e2 = e
(
c2,
(
h
s−1
α
2
)b0 k−1∏
i=0
(hsα
i
2 )
bi+1
)
= e(g1, h2)
F
α+ID ·rηs−b0rη. (2)
– Compute e(g1, g2)
rη by
e3 =
(e1
e2
) 1
b0
= e(g1, h2)
rη. (3)
– Extract the message by computing
M = e3 ⊕ c3 = R′|T |σw.
– If T is a tag identity, continue the next procedure; otherwise, repeat
this procedure with j = j + 1 until j = N .
Finally, the reader verifies σw = (σ1, σ2) as follows and sends R
′ to the tag.
e(σ1, h2) = e
(
w, d2T
)
e
(
H(d2T , T ), h
β
2
)
. (4)
– Upon receiving the random number R′ from the reader, the tag outputs
the reader identity ID if R′ = R. Otherwise, the tag outputs reject.
4.4 Correctness Analysis
If ID is one of designated readers, the decryption is correct.
e1 = e
(
c1, g
s
(α+ID)(β+ID)
2
)
= e
(
h
F (β+ID)rη
1 , g
s
(α+ID)(β+ID)
2
)
= e(g1, h2)
F
α+ID ·rηs
e2 = e
(
c2,
(
h
s−1
α
2
)b0 k−1∏
i=0
(hsα
i
2 )
bi+1
)
= e
(
gαrη1 ,
(
h
s−1
α
2
)b0 k−1∏
i=0
(hsα
i
2 )
bi+1
)
= e
(
grη1 , h
(s−1)b0
2
k∏
i=1
(hsα
i
2 )
bi
)
= e(g1, h2)
F
α+ID ·rηs−b0rη
e3 =
(e1
e2
) 1
b0
=
( e(g1, h2) Fα+ID ·rηs
e(g1, h2)
F
α+ID ·rηs−b0rη
) 1
b0
=
(
e(g1, h2)
b0rη
) 1
b0
= e(g1, h2)
rη
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The authentication of T in the equation (4) is correct.
e(σ1, h2) = e
(
wxHβ(d2T , T ), h2
)
= e(wx, h2)e
(
Hβ(d2T , T ), h2
)
= e(w, d2T )e
(
H(d2T , T ), h
β
2
)
.
Let T be chosen from Zp. Using the bilinear pairing defined in [18], we
have the group size satisfying 6|G1| ≤ 2|G2| = |GT |. Since |M | = |Zp|+ |Zp|+
|G1| + |G2| ≈ 3|G1| + |G2|. We deduce the group element e(g1, h2)rη ∈ GT is
long enough to XOR the message.
5 Security and Privacy
We analyze the security and privacy of our proposed PP-MADR scheme by
using a reduction technique. That is, if there exists an adversary who can break
the security or privacy against the PP-MADR, we construct an algorithm to
solve some believed-to-be-hard mathematical problems.
5.1 Complexity Assumptions
The hard problems we adopt are modified from the aMSE-DDH problem [24].
Here, α, ω, γ ∈ Zp are random exponents and, g′1, h′1 ∈ G1, g′2, h′2 ∈ G2 are
group elements satisfying
log
h′1
g′1
= log
h′2
g′2
.
The Pairing-aMSE-DDH Problem and the Group-aMSE-DDH Problem are de-
fined as follows.
Pairing-aMSE-DDH Problem:
Input: (1) g′2, g
′α
2 , g
′α2
2 , · · · , g′α
q−1
2
(2) g′ω2 , g
′ωα
2 , g
′ωα2
2 , · · · , g′ωα
q
2
(3) h′1, h
′α
1 , h
′α2
1 , · · · , h′α
n+1
1
(4) h′2, h
′α
2 , h
′α2
2 , · · · , h′α
n
2
(5) h′ω2 , h
′ωα
2 , h
′ωα2
2 , · · · , h′ωα
n
2
(6) f(x) ∈ Zp[x] has degrees q > n
(7) g(x) ∈ Zp[x] has degrees ≤ q, g(0) 6= 0
(8) gcd(f(x), g(x)) = 1
(9) g
′αf(α)
1 , g
′αγf(α)
1 h
′γg(α)
1 , Z
Decide: Z
?
= e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ ∈ GT .
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Group-aMSE-DDH Problem:
Input: (1) g′2, g
′α
2 , g
′α2
2 , · · · , g′α
q−1
2
(2) g′ω2 , g
′ωα
2 , g
′ωα2
2 , · · · , g′ωα
q
2
(3) h′1, h
′α
1 , h
′α2
1 , · · · , h′α
n+1
1
(4) h′2, h
′α
2 , h
′α2
2 , · · · , h′α
n
2
(5) h′ω2 , h
′ωα
2 , h
′ωα2
2 , · · · , h′ωα
n
2
(6) f(x) ∈ Zp[x] has degrees q > n
(7) g(x) ∈ Zp[x] has degrees ≤ q, g(0) 6= 0
(8) gcd(f(x), g(x)) = 1
(9) g
′αf(α)
1 , g
′αγf(α)
1 , Z, e(g
′
1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ
Decide: Z
?
= h
′γg(α)
1 ∈ G1.
Definition 5 The Pairing/Group-aMSE-DDH problem is (t, ε)-hard if for all
t-polynomial time adversaries, the maximum probability of solving this problem
is ε.
We give analysis under the generic group model based on [16]. Given the
challenge instance of Pairing-aMSE-DDH problem, one can compute
g
′αf(α)
1 , g
′A1(α)
2 , g
′ωA2(α)
2 , h
′A3(α)
1 , h
′A4(α)
2 , h
′ωA5(α)
2 ,
where A1(x), A2(x), A3(x), A4(x), A5(x) are polynomial functions with degrees
q−1, q, n+1, n, n at most, respectively. With the additional elements g′αγf(α)1 , h
′γg(α)
1 ,
one can further compute
e(g′1, h
′
2)
αγf(α)·A4(α), e(g′1, h
′
2)
γg(α)A1(α)
towards computing e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ . If e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ is computable from the
above combinations, we should have
γf(α) = γαf(α)A4(α) + γg(α)A1(α).
That is,
g(α)A1(α) = f(α)
(
1− αA4(α)
)
.
Since f(x) and g(x) are co-prime, we have f(x)|A1(x). However, A1(x) has
q− 1 degrees at most, and therefore A1(x) ≡ 0 and xA4(x) ≡ 1. On the other
hand, we have 0A4(0) = 0 which contradicts xA4(x) ≡ 1. This contradiction
indicates that e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ cannot be computed and it is independent of the
given challenge instance.
Given the challenge instance of Group-aMSE-DDH problem, one can com-
pute
g
′A1(α)
2 , g
′ωA2(α)
2 , h
′A3(α)
1 , h
′A4(α)
2 , h
′ωA5(α)
2 ,
from lines (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5), where A1(x), A2(x), A3(x), A4(x), A5(x)
are polynomial functions with degrees q−1, q, n+1, n, n at most, respectively.
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Let Z = h
′γgc(α)
1 for some polynomial function gc(x). One can only use
g
′A1(α)
2 , g
′ωA2(α)
2 , h
′A4(α)
2 , h
′ωA5(α)
2 for pairing computations with Z. We have
e(g′1, h
′
2)
γ·gc(α)A1(α), e(g′1, h
′
2)
γω·gc(α)A2(α),
e(h′1, h
′
2)
γ·gc(α)A4(α), e(h′1, h
′
2)
γω·gc(α)A5(α),
which contain unknown exponents γ or γω. They must be not 1GT when used
to decide Z.
According to the definition of Pairing-aMSE-DDH problem, e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ
is independent of other group elements. Since only g
′αγf(α)
1 contains the un-
known exponent γ in other elements, one must use it in pairing computations.
Therefore, the only matching types in comparison are pairings under the basics
e(g′1, h
′
2). I.E.,
– Deciding e(g′1, h
′
2)
γ·gc(α)A1(α) by computing
e
(
g
αγf(α)
1 , h
′A4(α)
2
)
.
– Deciding e(g′1, h
′
2)
γω·gc(α)A2(α) by computing
e
(
g
αγf(α)
1 , h
′ωA5(α)
2
)
.
For the above analysis, we deduce
gc(α)A1(α) = αf(α)A4(α)
or
gc(α)A2(α) = αf(α)A5(α).
That is, g(α)A1(α) must be computable from αf(α)A4(α) or g(α)A2(α) must
be computable from αf(α)A5(α) to solve the problem. Since f(x) and g(x)
are co-prime and g(0) 6= 0, we have
xf(x)|A1(x) or xf(x)|A2(x).
xf(x) has (q + 1)-degrees. However, A1(x) has q − 1 degrees and A2(x) has
q degrees at most. We therefore have A1(x) ≡ A2(x) ≡ 0. This contradiction
indicates that all pairings associated with h
′γg(α)
1 are independent of other
group element, and therefore it is hard to decide whether Z = h
′γg(α)
1 .
5.2 Proof of Security and Privacy
Tag Unforgeability. Our tag authentication utilizes the BLS signature scheme
to generate a private key of T and the Diffie-Hellman technique for identifi-
cation. wx is aggregated with the signature d3T for shorter length. Since the
BLS scheme [7] is provably secure and key exchange is secure, we have σw on
a random w ∈ G1 cannot be computed without the private key x. We avoid
the detailed security analysis of tag unforgeability.
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Theorem 1 (Message Indistinguishability) When the Pairing-aMSE-DDH
problem is (t, ε)-hard, the message indistinguishability of our scheme holds with
(t′, qk, ε
′). t′ = t− O(qkte + nte) ε′ = ε, where te denotes the time of a point
multiplication in G2.
Proof Suppose there exists an adversaryA who can break the message indistin-
guishability. We construct an algorithm B that solves the Pairing-aMSE-DDH
problem. The interaction between A and B is described as follows.
Initialization. Let BG = {G1,G2,GT , e, p} be the pairing group and {ID1, ID2,
· · · , IDK} be all identities of readers. The adversary outputs a designated-
reader group I∗ = {ID∗1 , ID∗2 , · · · , ID∗k} and an identity ID∗ for challenge.
If ID∗ ∈ {ID∗1 , ID∗2 , · · · , ID∗k}, the adversary cannot make the private key
query on ID∗. Otherwise, ID∗ /∈ I∗ and the adversary can query all private
keys.
Setup: B randomly chooses β0, β1 from Zp and defines the polynomial func-
tions g(x) and h(x) as
g(x) = (β0x+ β1 + ID
∗)
k∏
i=1
(
x+ ID∗i
)
,
h(x) =
∏L
i=1
(
x+ IDi
)(
β0x+ β1 + IDi
)
g(x)
.
Let f(x) be any q-degree polynomial function such that h(x)|f(x). We have
f(x) and g(x) are co-prime. B gets a challenge instance with the two polyno-
mial functions f(x), g(x). Then, B defines
β = β0α+ β1, g1 = g
′f(α)
1 , g2 = g
′f(α)
2 ,
h1 = h
′
1, h2 = h
′
2, h
αi
1 = h
′αi
1 ,
hβα
i
1 = h
′β0αi+1+β1αi
1 , g
α
1 = g
′αf(α)
1 , h
β
2 = h
′β0α+β1
2 ,
e(g1, h2) = e(g
′f(α)
1 , h
′
2) = e(
q∏
i=1
g′α
i−1fi
1 , h
′α
2 )e(g
′
1, h
′
2)
f0 ,
where fi is the coefficient of x
i in f(x). We have MPK is computable from
the challenge instance. B computes MPK and sends it to the adversary.
Query:
For a private key query on ID, we have that
(x+ ID)(β0x+ β1 + ID) - g(x)
and
(x+ ID)|f(x) or (β0x+ β1 + ID)|f(x).
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Let fID(x) be the polynomial function defined as
fID(x) = f
0 · (x+ ID)(β0x+ β1 + ID)
gcd
(
f(x), (x+ ID)(β0x+ β1 + ID)
) ,
where f0 is an integer and the coefficient of x0 in fID(x) is 1. We have fID(x)
is a polynomial function with one degree at most, and
f(x)fID(x)
(x+ ID)(β0x+ β1 + ID)
is a polynomial function with q − 1 degrees at most.
B randomly chooses s′ from Zp and defines the random number s for dID
as s = (s′ωα+ 1)fID(α). We have
g
s
(α+ID)(β+ID)
2 = g
′ f(α)(s
′ωα+1)fID(α)
(α+ID)(β0α+β1+ID)
2
= g
′ωα s
′f(α)fID(α)
(α+ID)(β0α+β1+ID)
2 g
′ f(α)fID(α)
(α+ID)(β0α+β1+ID)
2 ,
which is computable from the challenge input of (1) and (2), respectively.
Since the coefficient of x0 in fID(x) is 1, we have
x
∣∣(s′ωx+ 1)fID(x)− 1
such that
h
s−1
α
2 = h
′ (s
′ωα+1)fID(α)−1
α
2 ,
hsα
i
2 = h
′(s′ωα+1)fID(α)αi
2 = h
′ωs′αfID(α)αi
2 · h
′fID(α)αi
2 ,
which are all computable from the challenge input of (4) and (5) respectively.
B computes
dID =
(
g
s
(α+ID)(β+ID)
2 , h
s−1
α
2 , h
s
2, h
sα
2 , · · · , hsα
n−2
2
)
as above for the adversary, which is a valid private key of ID.
For the group token query on the designated-reader group {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDk},
the challenger randomly chooses η ∈ Zp and computes
(
hηF1 , h
ηFβ
1 , g
ηα
1 , e(g1, h2)
η
)
for the adversary, where F =
∑k
i=1(α + ID). Notice that the group token is
computable from the master public key. The challenger can always respond
queries from the adversary.
Challenge: The adversary outputs two messages (M0,M1) and (ID
∗,GT∗)
for challenge, where GT∗ is computed from I∗ = {ID∗1 , ID∗2 , · · · , ID∗k} as
GT∗ =
(
hηF1 , h
ηFβ
1 , g
ηα
1 , e(g1, h2)
η
)
.
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B randomly picks c ∈ {0, 1}∗ and sets the challenger ciphertext as(
h
′γg(α)
1 , g
′αγf(α)
1 , Z ⊕Mc
)
.
Let rη = γ, if Z = e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ , we have
h
′γg(α)
1 = h
F (β+ID∗)η·r
1
g
′αγf(α)
1 = g
αη·r
1
Z ⊕Mc = e(g1, h2)η·r ⊕Mc,
such that the challenge ciphertext is a valid ciphertext for Mc.
Win: The adversary A outputs a guess c′ of c and B outputs c′ as the solution
to the hard assumption.
This completes the description of our simulation. The time cost of sim-
ulation is mainly dominated by the private key simulation, where each key
requires O(q + n) point multiplications in G2. No abortion occurs during the
simulation. If Z = e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ , the adversary can output a correct guess
with probability of 12 + ε; otherwise, we have Z is a random element and the
adversary can guess only c with probability 1/2. This completes the security
proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Reader Indistinguishability) When the Group-aMSE-DDH
problem is (t, ε)-hard, the reader indistinguishability of our scheme holds with
(t′, qk, ε
′). t′ = t− O(qkte + nte) ε′ = ε, where te denotes the time of a point
multiplication in G2.
Proof Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break the reader indistin-
guishability. We can construct an algorithm B that solves the Group-aMSE-
DDH problem. The interaction between A and B is described as follows.
Initialization. Let BG = {G1,G2,GT , e, p} be the pairing group and {ID1, ID2,
· · · , IDL} be all identities. The adversary outputs two groups I0 = {ID∗01 , ID∗02 ,
· · · , ID∗0k0} and I1 = {ID
∗1
1 , ID
∗1
2 , · · · , ID∗1k1} for challenge. The adversary is
not allowed to query any identity in the above two groups.
Setup: B randomly chooses β ∈ Zp, c ∈ {0, 1} and sets
g(x) =
kc∏
i=1
(
x+ ID∗ci
)
,
h(x) =
∏L
i=1
(
x+ IDi
)(
β + IDi
)
g(x)
,
where β is one of the master secret keys. The remained simulation is the same
as the proof of theorem 1. B computes and sends MPK to the adversary.
Query: The private key simulation and group token computation are the same
as the proof of theorem 1.
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Challenge: B sets the challenge group token as
GT∗ =
(
Z, Zβ , g
′αγf(α)
1 , e(g
′
1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ
)
.
Let η = γ, if Z = h
′g(α)γ
1 , we have
F ∗ =
kc∏
i=1
(α+ ID∗ci ) = g(α),
hηF
∗
1 = h
′g(α)γ
1 = Z,
hηF
∗β
1 = h
′g(α)γβ
1 = Z
β ,
gαη1 = g
′αγf(α)
1 ,
e(g1, h2)
η = e(g′1, h
′
2)
f(α)γ ,
such that GT∗ is valid for Ic = {ID∗c1 , ID∗c2 , · · · , ID∗ckc}.
Win: The adversary A outputs a guess c′ of c and B outputs c′ as the solution
to the hard assumption.
This completes the description of our simulation. The time cost and prob-
ability analysis are the same as the proof in theorem 1. This completes the
security proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Token Indistinguishability) Reader indistinguishability im-
plies token indistinguishability.
Proof We note that the only difference between the two models is the definition
of challenge phase. We can easily simulate the challenge ciphertext using the
challenge group token.
Let GT∗ be the challenge group token in the reader indistinguishability
model. The challenger in the token indistinguishability model generates the
challenge ciphertext using (ID∗,GT∗) instead of (ID∗,GT∗c). When the two
group tokens denote the same designated-reader group, the only difference is
the random numbers η, ηc. We have
GT∗ =
(
hη
∗F
1 , h
η∗Fβ
1 , g
η∗α
1 , e(g1, h2)
η∗
)
GT∗c =
(
hη
∗F
1 , h
η∗Fβ
1 , g
η∗α
1 , e(g1, h2)
η∗
)
.
Let the challenge ciphertext from (ID∗,GT∗) be
C∗ =
(
h
F (β+ID∗)η∗·r
1 , g
η∗α·r
1 , e(g1, h2)
η∗·r ⊕M∗
)
.
It can be seen as a ciphertext for (ID∗,GT∗c) by viewing the use of random
number r′ =
rη∗c
η∗ in encryption. That is, C
∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext
in the token indistinguishability model. If the adversary can distinguish GT∗c
from the ciphertext, it means that we can reduce the attack to distinguish
designated-reader group from the group token GT∗.
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Table 1 The computational cost and storage cost of our protocol.
Entities Computation Storage
Server 4G1 + G2 + GT +H |G1|+ |G2|+ 2|Zp|
Reader N(e+ GT ) + 4e+H MPK + (N + n)|G2|
Tag 5G1 + GT |T |+ 4|G1|+ |G2|+ |GT |+ |Zp|
6 Evaluation of Our PP-MADR
The novelty of our PP-MADR protocol has been introduced in Section 2.3.
In this section, we evaluate our PP-MADR scheme in terms of computational
efficiency, storage efficiency and hardware requirement for RFID tags. We also
give comparison and discuss the privacy of reader identity during transmission.
6.1 Computation and Storage
The server computes dT and GT when a tag is created. With the master secret
key, the server can firstly compute all exponents before point multiplication
and exponentiation computation. Therefore, the main computational cost of
server during the creation of tag comprises of four point multiplications in
G1, one point multiplication in G2, one exponentiation in GT and one group
hashing operation.
The reader in our scheme mainly performs ciphertext decryption and σw
verification (only after successful decryption). During the decryption in com-
puting e2, we have hI =
(
h
s−1
α
2
)b0 ∏k−1
i=0 (h
sαi
2 )
bi+1 that is independent of ci-
phertext. This operation is associated with private key and I only, and it can
be pre-computed by the reader. For each designated-reader group, the decryp-
tion mainly costs two pairing computations and one exponentiation in GT .
The σw verification costs three pairing computation and one group hashing
operation. When the reader has N designated-reader groups, the reader must
take as input hI one by one in the pairing e2 computation until the reader
successfully decrypts the message or tries all of designated-reader groups.
The computational cost of tag is mainly dominated by σw computation
for identification proof and ciphertext generation for reader authentication.
We have σw costs one point multiplication in G1, and the ciphertext costs
four point multiplications in G1 and one exponentiation in GT . Our proto-
col is constructed from bilinear pairing, but tags do not perform any pairing
computation.
The server uploads T, dT and GT to tag, where dT = (x, h
x
2 , H
β(d2T , T ))
and GT =
(
hηF1 , h
ηFβ
1 , g
ηα
1 , e(g1, h2)
η
)
. We have dT = |Zp| + |G1| + |G2| and
|GT| = 3|G1|+ |GT |. The group token is constant-size and independent of the
number of designated readers. In our protocol, the sever only keeps its master
secret key and the reader keeps MPK, dID and hI1 , hI2 , · · · , hIN . The cost of
computation and storage is given in Table 1.
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6.2 Hardware Requirement
We adopt public-key cryptography to construct PP-MADR protocol with
strong privacy. The price to pay is the more complicated hardware for tags
compared to other protocols adopting symmetric cryptography for weak pri-
vacy. Fortunately, our PP-MADR protocol does not increase the hardware cost
on tags compared to the given tab authentication in Section 2.1.
The hardware implementation of a protocol on tags is composed of logic
controller (algorithm), memory and basic modules such as pseudo-random
number generator, point multiplication in G1 and exponentiation in GT . The
public key cryptography is more expensive in implementation compared to
symmetric cryptography due to the complicated modules for point multipli-
cation and exponentiation. Our protocol requires a tag to perform 5G1 + GT
for mutual authentication. Serial computations can be adopted to reduce the
hardware resource, but it at least requires one module for point multiplication
in G1 and one module for exponentiation in GT . Notice that the tag in the tag
authentication from the proposed IBE schemes such as [5,44,19] also require
both modules G1 and GT to perform encryption. Therefore, the hardware re-
quirement of our scheme is the same as the encryption algorithm of these IBE
schemes.
Many hardware implementations (e.g. [32,22,27]) towards cheap processors
for point multiplication and exponentiation have been proposed. They become
useful when the tag must be equipped with low-cost hardware. Recently, the
authors in [37] showed that identity-based key agreements are feasible on RFID
tags equipped with MSP430F2618 microcontrollers. The agreements require
pairing computation which needs both the modules of point multiplication in
G1 and exponentiation in GT . It indicates that our PP-MADR protocol is also
feasible for RFID systems when tags are equipped with the same kind of chips.
6.3 Tradeoff and Limitations
Our PP-MARD protocol provides strong privacy on tags and designated read-
ers, such that tags are indistinguishable from authentication and designated
readers are indistinguishable from authentication and the secret state on tag.
The price to pay for this strong privacy is as follows.
RFID tags have to perform asymmetric computations such as the point
multiplications in the elliptic curve group. We note that strong privacy cannot
be realized using symmetric cryptography.
RFID readers have to perform computations in the linear of the number
of their reader groups. If a reader has been designated in N groups, the worst
case requires N times of decryption. We note that the designated reader group
requires to be anonymous in the PP-MADR protocol, and therefore the guess
procedure producing linear time in computation cannot be avoided.
In our PP-MADR protocol, we didn’t consider how to update designated
reader group or private key. The update on the designated reader group is
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relatively easy. It requires the server to re-create the group token on tag and
publish the new group. We note that the update on private key especially for
readers is challenging, as we have to solve the key revocation problem. How
to efficiently realize these extensions is out of scope of this work.
6.4 Comparison of Protocols
In this section, we compare our protocol with several related protocols intro-
duced in Section 2. We summarize those protocols which are stated as follows.
– Protocol 1. This protocol is realized using a tag authentication protocol
with weak privacy, where only those designated readers who have secret
keys from the server can conduct mutual authentication.
– Protocol 1+. This protocol is the same as Protocol 1 except that the
adopted tag authentication protocol is based on an identity-based encryp-
tion with strong privacy. A more detailed description is given in the last
paragraph of Section 2.2.
– Protocol 2. This protocol is realized using an identity-based encryption to
achieve mutual authentication, where tag identity is encrypted if the reader
is one of designated readers. The tag will disclose its designated readers hI
to all readers for each authentication query, such that a valid reader can
generate a valid proof of ID ∈ I and H(I) = hI.
– Protocol 2+. This protocol is similar with Protocol 2 without disclosing
its designated readers. The reader guesses hI one by one. For each proof of
ID ∈ I and H(I) = hI from the reader, the tag first checks whether hI is its
designated readers. If true, it uses an identity-based encryption to achieve
tag authentication and reader authentication by encrypting T |σw|R for
identity ID. Otherwise, it encrypts a dummy string. The dummy encryp-
tion is desired to protect hI as the proof of ID ∈ I and H(I) = hI can be
generated by all adversaries.
The comparison of these protocols is given in Table 2. The privacy pro-
tection on designated readers requires linear computation on readers as the
readers have to select a correct group first. Protocol 1+ achieves the same
privacy protections as ours but it requires the server to generate private keys
for all designated readers when a tag is created. In comparison with Proto-
col 2, ours requires a linear computation on tags but provides strong privacy
protection on designated readers. Our protocol is better than Protocol 2+ in
terms of computational efficiency and privacy protection. The only disadvan-
tage of our protocols is requiring asymmetric computation on tag and linear
asymmetric computation on readers. As we noted before, these two drawbacks
are the tradeoff towards strong privacy on tag and reader.
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Table 2 The comparison of protocols towards different privacy protection. Here, symmetric
refers to those computations such as hashing operation, while asymmetric refers to those
computations such as exponentiation and point multiplication.
Protocols Tag Readers
Protocol 1 One Symmetric Linear Symmetric
Protocol 1+ One IBE encryption Linear IBE decryption
Protocol 2
One IBE encryption One IBE decryption
+One Symmetric +One Symmetric
Protocol 2+
Linear IBE encryption Linear IBE decryption
+Linear Symmetric +Linear Symmetric
Our Protocol One Asymmetric Linear Asymmetric
Protocols Privacy of Tag Privacy of Readers Disadvantage
Protocol 1 Weak Privacy Weak Privacy New Key & Linear
Protocol 1+ Strong Privacy Strong Privacy New Key & Linear
Protocol 2 Strong Privacy No Protection No reader privacy
Protocol 2+ Strong Privacy Week Privacy Linear Computation
Our Protocol Strong Privacy Strong Privacy Asymmetric & Linear
6.5 Preserving Privacy on Reader Identity
In our PP-MADR protocol, the reader identity is transmitted in a plaintext.
An adversary who eavesdrops the authentication will know ID is one of des-
ignated readers if the reader sends back the response R′. This issue does not
compromise the privacy problem as in our security model, an adversary is not
allowed to distinguish the group token GT with the help of readers. To enhance
the security, in this section, we show how to hide the reader identity during
transmission (Fig 4) against other adversaries who are not designated readers.
Our protocol uses a particular membership encryption EGT,ID[M ] such that
successful decryption requires the private key of ID and ID ∈ GT. Notice that
if the encryptor uses GT in encryption without ID, where the ciphertext is(
hFβη·r1 , h
Fη·r
1 , g
ηα·r
1 , e(g1, h2)
η·rM
)
,
we have it is an identity-based broadcast encryption where all readers in GT
can decrypt the message. For receiver ID, it firstly converts the ciphertext
into (
h
F (β+ID)η·r
1 , g
ηα·r
1 , e(g1, h2)
η·rM
)
,
which is the EGT,ID[M ] encryption. Then, it runs the decryption as the descrip-
tion in our protocol. The security of this broadcast encryption is guaranteed
by the message indistinguishability in Theorem 1.
The extended PP-MADR protocol for hiding reader identity is outlined
as follows. The reader firstly sends an authentication query to the tag. Upon
receiving the query, the tag runs the broadcast encryption on random keys
K1,K2. If the reader ID is one of designated readers, it decrypts the random
keys and uses K1 to encrypt ID to the tag. The following protocol is the same
as the original protocol except that EGT,ID[M ] could leak the reader identity
ID. We use K2 ⊕ EGT,ID[M ] to denote an XOR encryption on hF (β+ID)η·r1
with the random key K2 to protect ID.
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Tag Reader
(T, dT ,GT) MPK, dID, I
w←−−
C1 = EGT[K1,K2]
C1−−→
Decrypt K1,K2
Compute C2 = K1 ⊕ ID
C2←−−
ID = K1 ⊕ C2
M = R|T |σw
C = K2 ⊕ EID,GT[M ]
Store (ID,R)
C−−→
Decrypt M = R′|T |σw
Output T if σw is valid
Otherwise, output Reject
R′←−−
Output ID if R′ = R
Otherwise, output Reject
Fig. 4 Our Extended PP-MADR protocol.
This extended protocol hides the reader identity during transmission, such
that only designated readers know the reader identity. The price to pay of this
extension is double encryption on tag.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol with desig-
nated readers (PP-MADR) for RFID security. In this notion, only tags and
their designated readers can authenticate each other. Other readers and ad-
versaries cannot trace RFID tags or know their designated readers. In our
protocol, the storage cost and computational cost on tags for mutual authen-
tication are constant, independent of the number of designated readers. The
RFID system server does not need to compute new keys for readers when a tag
is created. Our protocol strongly preserves the privacy of tag and its designated
readers even if the adversary can corrupt the tag and obtain its secret state.
In comparison with other possible solutions, our protocol has demonstrated
clear advantages.
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